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INTRODUCTION
“Researchers and lawmakers warn: Florida is ‘Ground Zero’ for
sea level rise.”1 “This map shows how screwed Miami is if sea levels
keep rising.”2 “Bay area communities brace for flood insurance on-
slaught.”3 “Despite no floods, Brevard residents find themselves living
in a flood zone.”4
Climate change is a reality, and Florida is uniquely situated to
feel its effects sooner than other states.5 This is due to the prediction of
a substantially rising sea level and the fact that a majority of the most
populated and popular areas in Florida are located along or near the
coasts.6 In particular, Florida’s residents have long been victims of ex-
treme weather events, including hurricanes, tornados, storm surges,
and the resultant flooding during and after these events.7  Federal,
state, and local governments have long taken a reactive approach to
preparing for and insuring against the possibility of extreme weather
conditions, focusing too much on rebuilding the risk rather than pru-
dently retreating from it. The harsh reality is that a complete and
proportionate response to climate change is highly implausible due to
the rigid nature of our society and the sense of entitlement many
1. Agence France-Presse, Researchers and Lawmakers Warn: Florida is ‘Ground Zero’
for Sea Level Rise, RAW STORY (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2014/04/research
ers-and-lawmakers-warn-florida-is-ground-zero-for-sea-level-rise.
2. Gus Lubin, This Map Shows How Screwed Miami is if Sea Levels Keep Rising, BUS.
INSIDER (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/map-of-miami-when-sea-levels-
rise-2014-4.
3. Josh Boatwright, Bay Area Communities Brace for Flood Insurance Onslaught, IN-
SURANCENEWSNET (Feb. 4, 2015), http://insurancenewsnet.com/oarticle/2015/02/04/bay-
area-communities-brace-for-flood-insurance-onslaught-a-589926.html#.VODuUPnF91A.
4. Christopher Heath, 9 Investigates: Despite No Floods, Brevard Residents Find
Themselves Living in a Flood Zone, WFTV (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.wftv.com/news/news/
local/9-investigates-despite-no-floods-brevard-residents/njhJZ.
5. See Climate Change: How Do We Know?, NASA GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, http://
climate.nasa.gov/evidence (last visited Aug. 26, 2015) [hereinafter NASA].
6. See NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL COASTAL
POPULATION REPORT:  POPULATION TRENDS FROM 1970 TO 2020 4 (2013), available at http://
stateofthecoast.noaa.gov/features/coastal-population-report.pdf [hereinafter NOAA 2013].
7. See NOAA Office for Coastal Management, Historical Hurricane Tracks, DIG-
ITALCOAST, http://coast.noaa.gov/digitalcoast/historical-hurricane-tracks (last visited Aug.
26, 2015). This site, as part of the NOAA Office of Coastal Management, offers an interac-
tive mapping program to search and display hurricane data, view coastal population data,
and access National Hurricane Center storm reports. The search parameters also allow for
the inclusion of tropical storms, depressions, etc.
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Americans feel with regard to coastal land ownership, use, and
protection.
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
defines a coastal area as one in which “at least fifteen percent of the
county’s total land area is located within the Nation’s coastal water-
shed; or a portion of or the entire county accounts for at least fifteen
percent of a coastal cataloging unit.”8 “A watershed is an area of land
that water flows across as it moves toward a common body of water,
such as a stream, river, lake, or coast.”9 In 2008, 15.9% of Florida’s
population lived along the coastline, nearly doubling from the 8.1% cal-
culated in 1960.10 As of 2010, over fifty percent of the U.S. population
lived in coastal watershed counties.11 To put that into perspective,
nearly all of Florida could arguably be considered a coastal water-
shed.12 In most Florida counties, all of which are on or near a coast,
global warming has a multiplier effect on the likelihood of extreme
floods from a factor of just 1.1 up to a factor of 7, depending on the
region.13 This article evaluates the effects of flood risks along Florida’s
coasts in light of a much-needed overhaul of the National Flood Insur-
ance Program14 (NFIP) as a location-sensitive adaptive response to
climate change.
By incorporating more location-sensitive options for purchasers
of flood insurance, the NFIP is ideally positioned to transform from
running at a deficit15 into the functional equivalent of an insurance
program Americans expect. The NFIP could be a program that is ade-
quately self-funded to pay out insurance claims for flooding and flood
damage; consistently rewards proactive measures against flooding and
risks of extreme weather events; raises awareness of the personal and
financial risks and costs associated with coastal land ownership; and,
8. STEVEN G. WILSON & THOMAS R. FISCHETTI, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COASTLINE POPU-
LATION TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1960 TO 2008 3 (2010), available at https://www
.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/p25-1139.pdf.
9. Watersheds, SW FLA. WATER MGMT. DIST., http://www.swfwmd.state.fl.us/education
/watersheds (last visited Aug. 26, 2015).
10. WILSON & FISCHETTI, supra note 8.
11. NOAA 2013, supra note 6, at 3.
12. WILSON & FISCHETTI, supra note 8, at 19.
13. BEN STRAUSS ET AL., CLIMATE CENTRAL, FLORIDA AND THE SURGING SEA: A VULNERA-
BILITY ASSESSMENT WITH PROJECTIONS FOR SEA LEVEL RISE AND COASTAL FLOOD RISK 18
(Apr. 2014), available at http://sealevel.climatecentral.org/uploads/ssrf/FL-Report.pdf.
14. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4001 (2014).
15. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-297R, FLOOD INSURANCE:
OVERVIEW OF GAO’S PAST WORK ON THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 9 (2014). As
of 2013, the NFIP was in debt to the U.S. Treasury for approximately $24 billion dollars.
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provides location-specific options for coping with climate change adap-
tation and retreat.
Part I of this article examines the realities of climate change,
including the global rise in temperatures, sea-level rise and coastal
erosion, storm surge, and coastal storm ferocity. Part II reviews the
current state of the most significant attempt at flood insurance by the
Federal government, the NFIP. Part II also reviews Florida’s statewide
initiatives, as well as local initiatives of three distinct Florida counties,
each of which is positioned to feel the effects of climate change in sub-
tly different, yet potentially devastating, ways. Part III addresses the
importance of recognizing the different effects that the necessary flood
insurance reform will have on the three counties and how extending
the NFIP in a workable manner is necessary to promote the longevity
and safety of these regions. Part III also discusses how implementing a
variety of options for adaptation is essential to address flood risk dif-
ferences from region to region, emphasizing that insurance is not
usually, and should not be treated as, a “one size fits all” product.
I. CLIMATE CHANGE REALITIES
The global temperature has increased most dramatically from
1983 to 2012, with an overall rise of .85°C from 1850 to 2014.16 Scien-
tists overwhelmingly agree that the increase in global temperatures is
due primarily to human contribution of greenhouse gases into the at-
mosphere.17 In its 2014 synthesis report, the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) posited that “it is likely that extreme sea
levels . . . have increased since 1970, being mainly the result of mean
sea-level rise.”18 The IPCC also opined with high confidence that the
long-term increases in economic losses from climate and weather-re-
lated disasters are due to increasing exposure of people and economic
assets.19 If that were not enough, the IPCC predicted with very high
confidence that coastal systems and low-lying areas will increasingly
experience submergence, flooding, and erosion due to sea-level rise.20
16. LISA ALEXANDER ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2013 THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 3 (Thomas F.
Stocker et al. eds., 2014), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg1/
WGIAR5_SPM_brochure_en.pdf.
17. Id. at 11-12.
18. CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT 53 (2014), available at http://www
.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_All_Topics.pdf.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 67.
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A. Effects of Climate Change
Since record keeping began, nine of the ten warmest years oc-
curred during the 21st century.21 The year 2014 marked the 38th
consecutive year since 1977 that the yearly global temperature was
above average.22 For 650,000 years, the amount of carbon dioxide in
the atmosphere did not exceed 300 parts per million.23 As of 2014, the
carbon dioxide levels reached an unprecedented 400 parts per mil-
lion.24 The IPCC assessment of climate change concluded with over
ninety percent probability that the unparalleled global warming exper-
ienced—a departure from the past 650,000 years in Earth’s history—is
due to human activities.25 These facts scientifically and irrefutably
confirm that the Earth is warming at an increased rate compared to
previous periods in history and that the increase is due to humans.26
Human influences by way of industrialization, deforestation, and burn-
ing of fossil fuels have contributed most significantly to the sharp
increase in the emission of greenhouse gases since 1880.27 IPCC scien-
tists predict that the global surface temperature change for 2016-2035,
relative to 1986-2005, will be in the range of 0.3°C to 0.7°C.28 This in-
crease in global temperature begs the question: will this increase
disproportionately pose greater risks for already warm and heavily
populated coastal regions?
In 2014, Florida surpassed New York to become the third most
populous state in the United States, boasting a population of 19.9 mil-
lion.29 Also, Florida is home to some of the most heavily populated
coastal areas.30 As a result of global temperature rise on land and sea,
21. Global Analysis – Annual 2014, NOAA NAT’L CENTERS FOR ENVTL. INFO. (Jan.
2015), http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/global/2014/13. Recorded history started in 1880.
22. Id.
23. NASA, supra note 5.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.; ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 16.
27. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, CAUSES OF SEA LEVEL RISE:  WHAT THE SCIENCE
TELLS US 1 (Apr. 2013), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/
documents/global_warming/Causes-of-Sea-Level-Rise.pdf.
28. ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 16, at 18.
29. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FLORIDA PASSES NEW YORK TO BECOME THE NATION’S
THIRD MOST POPULOUS STATE, CENSUS BUREAU REPORTS (Dec. 23, 2014), available at http://
www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2014/cb14-232.html.
30. NOAA 2013, supra note 6; WILSON & FISCHETTI, supra note 8.
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many coastal regions are taking the brunt of the most immediate im-
pacts of climate change by way of sea level rise and coastal erosion.31
As the Earth warms and forces the oceans to absorb excessive
amounts of carbon, the top layers of the ocean warm, too, contributing
to thermal expansion of the oceans and other bodies of salt water.32
Although thermal expansion contributed more significantly to rising
sea levels immediately following the Industrial Revolution, that influ-
ence has generally remained constant in recent years.33 While it may
seem like the leveling off of the thermal expansion of the oceans and
seas is encouraging, its positive effects are overshadowed by the fact
that the shrinking of land ice has accelerated, thereby negating any
delay in the rising of sea levels.34
Climate Central, after conducting a comprehensive sea level
rise analysis of fifty-five sites across the United States, found that
Florida is home to about half of the exposed population and eight of the
top ten at-risk cities.35 Susceptibility to sea level rise is a strong indica-
tion of increased susceptibility to storm surges, tidal surge flooding,
and extreme flood events caused by stronger and more vicious
storms.36
Conceding that the link between hurricane intensity, ocean
temperatures, and human influence is complex, the consensus is still
that there has been a substantial increase in the intensity and dura-
tion of Atlantic hurricanes since the 1980s.37 Along with the possibility
of extreme flooding from harsher storm activity, the National Climate
Assessment predicts that the instances of heavy downpours will in-
crease by twenty-seven percent for the Southeast region of the United
States, including Florida.38
31. See generally ERIKA SPANGER-SIEGFRIED ET AL., UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
ENCROACHING TIDES: HOW SEA LEVEL RISE AND TIDAL FLOODING THREATEN U.S. EAST AND
GULF COAST COMMUNITIES OVER THE NEXT 30 YEARS (Oct. 2014), available at http://www
.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2014/10/encroaching-tides-full-report.pdf.
32. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 27, at 1.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 13, at 2.
36. JOHN WALSH & DONALD WUEBBLES ET AL., NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT,
CHANGES IN HURRICANES (2014), available at http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report/our-
changing-climate/changes-hurricanes.
37. Id.
38. JOHN WALSH & DONALD WUEBBLES ET AL., NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, HEAVY
DOWNPOURS INCREASING (2014), available at http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report/our-
changing-climate/heavy-downpours-increasing.
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B. Hurdles to Climate Change Adaption
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) plays a
vital role in providing information regarding disaster planning and re-
lief in the aftermath of a disaster.39 Some unintended consequences of
providing insurance against and financial relief from natural disasters
have materialized since the inception of the NFIP.40 Some, but cer-
tainly not all, of the unintended consequences of providing cheap flood
insurance and not requiring mitigation has resulted in a moral hazard
dilemma and cognitive biases,41 as discussed further in the following
sections.
1. Moral Hazard
Moral hazard refers to the idea that those insured against a
particular type of loss will take fewer precautions to avoid the risks
associated with that type of loss.42 Moral hazard, as a term of art,
traces its origins to the insurance industry.43 Economists embraced
this term to describe the “loss-increasing behavior that arises under
insurance.”44 Innate to the insurer-insured relationship is the shifting
of responsibility, specifically financial.45 The practical effect of this con-
cept as it relates to flood insurance is that the availability of a
subsidized policy encourages people to live in high-risk areas because
of the perception that they are protected.46 Although research and
literature are available regarding the moral hazard dilemma in other
fields, the information currently available regarding flood insurance,
specifically, is limited.47
39. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, https://www.fema.gov (last visited Aug. 26,
2015) [hereinafter FEMA].
40. Jennifer Wriggins, Flood Money: The Challenge of U.S. Flood Insurance Reform in
a Warming World, 119 PENN ST. L. REV. 361, 384-95 (2014).
41. Id.
42. Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 252 (1996);
Wriggins, supra note 40, at 388.
43. David Rowell & Luke B. Connelly, A History of the Term “Moral Hazard”, 79 J.
RISK & INS. 1051, 1051 (2012).
44. Id.
45. Wriggins, supra note 40, at 388.
46. Id.
47. A majority of the research tends to focus on either medical issues or other forms of
insurance that are not readily comparable to flood insurance.
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2. Cognitive Biases
Other issues hindering many home and property owners’ deci-
sions to mitigate or purchase flood insurance are the cognitive biases
that form around high cost-low probability events, such as tsunamis
and meteor impacts.48 These theories—normalcy bias, risk compensa-
tion, and gambler’s fallacy—apply not only to individuals, but to the
government as well.49
Normalcy bias is the refusal to plan for, or react to, a disaster
that has never before happened.50 A good example of normalcy bias in
action comes from a Brevard County news story, wherein a woman
who was recently mapped into a flood zone thought she did not need
insurance because she never experienced a flood in her area.51 Risk
compensation is the tendency to take greater risks when the perceived
safety increases.52 It has been suggested that analyzing visibility, ef-
fect, motivation, and control can help provide guidance for injury
prevention measures.53 The analysis of these variables may be used to
assess the probability and extent to which risk-compensating behavior
is demonstrated with regard to flooding mitigation and adaptation.54
Gambler’s fallacy is the tendency to think future probabilities are al-
tered by past events or, more specifically, that the probability of an
event is reduced if the same or similar event has recently occurred.55
The research regarding these biases, like moral hazard, tends to focus
on issues other than flood insurance. However, the theories do lend
themselves to general application in flood-related disaster scenarios.
48. Adam F. Scales, A Nation of Policyholders: Governmental and Market Failure in
Flood Insurance, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 3, 9 (2006-2007).
49. Id. at 12.
50. See Haim Omer & Nahman Alon, The Continuity Principle: A Unified Approach to
Disaster and Trauma, 22 AM. J.  CMTY. PSYCHOL. 273, 273-74 (1994).
51. Heath, supra note 4.
52. See James Hedlund, Risky Business: Safety Regulations, Risk Compensation, and
Individual Behavior, 6 INJURY PREVENTION 82, 84-86 (2000), available at http://in-
juryprevention.bmj.com/content/6/2/82.full.pdf. An example would be the idea that having a
seat belt law will influence some drivers to drive with less caution.
53. Id. at 88.
54. Id.
55. Dek Terrell, A Test of the Gambler’s Fallacy: Evidence from Pari-Mutuel Games, 8
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 309, 309-10 (1994).
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II. EXISTING FLOOD INSURANCE FRAMEWORK
A. Federal Initiatives
The Federal government introduced its national flood insurance
initiative in 196856 and the government has attempted to make it a
workable and solvent program ever since. The most notable efforts be-
gan in 1994, with the National Flood Insurance Reform Act.57 This act
was followed by the Biggert-Waters Act in 2012,58 and finally resulted
in the Affordability Act of 2014.59 The sections that follow will detail
each significant step in the evolution of the Federal government’s flood
insurance program.
1. National Flood Insurance Act and Program
In 1968, the federal government saw a need for federal inter-
vention in the flood insurance industry.60 Its efforts resulted in the
enactment of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, and implemen-
tation of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).61 It became
apparent to Congress that the private insurance industry was not
ready or able to provide competitive premium pricing that reflected the
actual level of risk they were willing to underwrite.62 Rather than leav-
ing homes and property owners unprotected, the NFIP aimed to create
a uniform national program to address the potential losses and dam-
ages caused by flooding.63
From the outset, the NFIP objectives were simple: to create a
self-sustaining federal flood insurance program funded by collected
premiums for land located in flood hazard areas as determined by
FEMA and in compliance with the program’s proposed system of na-
tional management of flood plains.64 Within the NFIP, the federal
government plays the role of financier, while private insurance compa-
56. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (2014).
57. National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103–325, 108 Stat. 2255.
58. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat.
916-88.
59. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, 128
Stat. 1020.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (2014) (outlining congressional findings).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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nies administer the program.65 Ancillary to the goal of pooling risk
among a national base, the program was intended to encourage mitiga-
tion behaviors for those communities that participated.66
The NFIP is intended to work in a relatively simple manner.
FEMA funds the program through collection of policy premiums and
receives appropriations for some flood mapping and mitigation activi-
ties.67 Due to the unpredictability of natural disasters and the high
correlation among filing of claims after these disasters, it has become
necessary in some of the more severe instances for FEMA to borrow
from the U.S. Treasury if premiums collected do not cover claim
payouts, which has happened after every major hurricane or storm of
the 21st century.68 Congress sets the limits on FEMA’s borrowing au-
thority and, as of December 31, 2013, FEMA’s borrowing authority was
$30.4 billion.69 Premiums collected also cover the program’s operation
expenses, outreach, and research, in addition to paying out claims.70
While $30.4 billion sounds like a large amount of money, the NFIP is
currently in debt to the U.S. Treasury for about $24 billion.71
The NFIP agenda consists of three components: risk identifica-
tion and assessment, risk mitigation, and insurance.72 In risk
identification and assessment, the NFIP tasked FEMA with identify-
ing and mapping all flood plain areas, including special hazard areas,
and establishing and updating flood-risk zone data (flood insurance
rate maps or FIRMs) to make estimates with respect to rates of proba-
ble flood-caused losses.73 Secondly, the NFIP encouraged state and
local measures that: constrict development of land exposed to flood
damage; guide development of proposed construction away from loca-
tions threatened by flood hazards; assist in reducing damage caused by
floods; and otherwise improve the long-range land management and
use of flood-prone areas.74 Lastly, the NFIP program provides flood in-
surance to the extent that the community has been mapped by FEMA,
65. Id.
66. Rachel Lisotta, In over Our Heads: The Inefficiencies of the National Flood Insur-
ance Program and the Institution of Federal Tax Incentives, 10 LOY. MAR. L. J. 511, 514
(2012).
67. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Ernest B. Abbott, Eye of the Storm: Hurricane Sandy Response and Rebuilding
Strategies Through the Lens of Environmental Justice, 26 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 10, 29-
30 (2014).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 4101 (2014).
74. § 4102.
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risk assessed, and the local government has instituted the required or-
dinances under the program’s guidelines for flood plain management.75
The National Flood Insurance Act defines a flood as “hav[ing]
such meaning as may be prescribed in regulations of the Administra-
tor, and may include inundation from rising waters or from the
overflow of streams, rivers, or other bodies of water, or from tidal
surges, abnormally high tidal water, tidal waves, tsunamis, hurri-
canes, or other severe storms or deluge.”76 Providing insurance and
creating incentives to mitigate flood risks and damage seems reasona-
ble given that ninety percent of all natural disasters in the United
States involve flooding.77
As of September 30, 2013, there were approximately 22,000
communities participating in the NFIP, which equates to more than
5.5 million policies in force.78 Although it may seem counterintuitive,
not all individuals in flood prone areas are required to purchase flood
insurance.79 Individual participation in the NFIP is predicated on
whether the community in which the individual’s property is situated
has adopted and enforces the NFIP floodplain management regula-
tions.80 If so, participation may still be optional if the property is not
financed through regulated lending institutions,81 government-spon-
sored enterprises for housing, or federal agency lenders.82 To the
extent that flood insurance is actually available, it may not be required
in all instances. For example, flood insurance is not required if the
property is outside of the high-risk area.83
75. §§ 4011, 4012(c).
76. § 4121.
77. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 3.
78. Id. at 24.
79. About the National Flood Insurance Program: When Insurance is Required, FLOOD-
SMART.GOV, https://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/about/when_insurance_is_re
quired.jsp (last updated June 17, 2015).
80. Id.
81. Includes “any bank, savings and loan association, credit union, farm credit bank,
Federal land bank association, production credit association, or similar institution subject
to the supervision on a Federal entity for lending regulation.” 42 U.S.C. § 4003(a)(10)
(2015).
82. Defining these agencies as “Federal agenc[ies] that make[] direct loans secured by
improved real estate or a mobile home.” 42 U.S.C. § 4003(a)(7) (2015).
83. “In high-risk areas, there is at least a 1 in 4 chance of flooding during a 30-year
mortgage. All home and business owners in these areas with mortgages from federally regu-
lated or insured lenders are required to buy flood insurance.” Defining Flood Risks,
FLOODSMART.GOV, https://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/flooding_flood_risks/defin
ing_flood_risks.jsp (last updated June 17, 2015).
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To encourage participation in the national program, the govern-
ment implemented the National Flood Disaster Act of 1973.84 The 1973
Act authorized FEMA to grant premium subsidies to create incentives
for communities and property owners to accept the program’s require-
ments.85 By 1980, nearly all communities with flood hazard areas
agreed to join the program, and the Act added mandatory purchase
requirements for properties in certain flood-prone areas.86 The 1973
Act was followed by the implementation of FEMA’s “Write Your Own”
(WYO) program in 1983. In this program, private insurers were au-
thorized to market NFIP flood policies; however, the federal
government remained the guarantor for the WYO insurers.87
In a continuing effort to make purchasing a flood insurance pol-
icy mandatory, the federal government enacted the National Flood
Insurance Reform Act of 1994.88 Under the 1994 Act, the government
expanded the mandatory flood insurance purchase requirement and
prohibited further flood disaster assistance for properties that did not
maintain flood insurance.89 More specifically, the 1994 Act required
three new categories of people to purchase flood insurance: those who
received their loans from federally regulated institutions or whose
loans were secured by improved real estate or a manufactured home;
those whose loans have been purchased by the Federal National Mort-
gage Association or Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation; and
property owners in participating special flood hazard area (SFHA)
communities who received federal financial assistance for property ac-
quisition and construction purposes.90
Even though the government was attempting to implement a
flood insurance purchasing requirement, it also wanted to help owners
afford flood insurance. The two most prominent ways in which the
NFIP furthered these two objectives was by granting heavily subsi-
dized premiums and allowing for grandfathered rates.91 The
subsidized policies are predominantly for properties built before Flood
Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) became available and are referred to as
84. Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93–234, HR 8449, 87 Stat. 975.
85. Quynh T. Pham, The Future of the National Flood Insurance Program in the After-
math of Hurricane Katrina, 12 CONN. INS. L. J. 629, 632 (2006).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103–325, 108 Stat. 2255.
89. THOMAS L. HAYES & SHAMA S. SABADE, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM, AC-
TUARIAL RATE REVIEW 2 (Nov. 30, 2004), available at http://www.fema.gov/media-library-
data/20130726-1554-20490-7222/rate_rev04.pdf.
90. Pham, supra note 85, at 642.
91. Abbott, supra note 72, at 30-33.
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“pre-FIRM” policies.92 The assumption was that subsidized policies
would be eliminated over time due to attrition by way of code compli-
ance, triggered by substantial damage or substantial improvements.93
Other subsidized policies are those for properties behind certain unfin-
ished or decertified levees, certain post-FIRM properties, and
emergency program properties.94 Conversely, grandfathered premiums
are generally those premiums that reflect the FIRM risk as calculated
when the policy was taken out, rather than a premium based on the
present day, and actual, FIRM risk.95
In its original iteration, it is easy to see how the National Flood
Insurance Act and its program were well intended—but in hindsight, it
is evident that the program has fallen woefully short of its original
objectives. The state of the NFIP as of the 1994 Act was as follows:
nearly all communities that were eligible to participate in the NFIP
participated; flood insurance has now become a requirement for all
properties financed through any federally insured or regulated lending
institution; and all new construction and substantial improvement to
existing structures (improvement by more than fifty percent of the
property’s fair market value) are to be assessed premiums that reflect
actuarially sound risk rates.96
Of the 900 weather-related loss events that occurred worldwide
in 2014, 20% of the events happened in North America, including Cen-
tral America and the Caribbean.97 This means that there is an 18%
chance that, in the event of a natural disaster in the United States,
victims will experience flood related loss or damage. To put this into
perspective, some states, such as Florida, require drivers to carry car
insurance.98 In 2014, 1.5% of car crashes in Florida resulted in in-
jury.99 This means that the average citizen has a 1.5% chance of
getting injured in a car accident and an 18% chance of losing his/her
home to a flood. However, insurance is only required in one of these
scenarios.
92. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 5.
93. Abbott, supra note 72, at 30.
94. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 5 n.10.
95. Abbott, supra note 72, at 30.
96. See supra pp. 10-14.
97. See MUNICH REINSURANCE, NATCAT SERVICES, available at http://www.munichre
.com/site/corporate/get/documents_E-890092315/mr/assetpool.shared/Documents/5_Touch/
Natural%20Hazards/NatCatService/Annual%20Statistics/2014/mr-natcatservice-natural
disaster-2014-Loss-events-worldwide-continents.pdf.
98. See Resource Center, FLA. HIGHWAY SAFETY & MOTOR VEHICLES, http://www.flhsmv
.gov (last visited Aug. 26, 2015).
99. Id.
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A community that incorporates a mandate for the best available
mitigation and adaptation strategies in its community development
plan or flood plain management scheme is eligible to participate in the
Community Rating System (CRS).100 This program rates each county
or city according to its efforts with regard to alleviating the risk of
flooding and flood damage.101 Each county receives a ranking from
nine to one, with one being the best rating.102 The closer the rating is
to one, the higher percentage discount the community receives on its
NFIP flood insurance rates.103 More than 67% of all flood insurance
policies are written in CRS communities, even though CRS communi-
ties only make up about 5% of the 22,000 communities who participate
in the NFIP.104
2. Biggert-Waters Reform and Flood Insurance Affordability Act
In an effort to relieve taxpayers of the burden of paying for dis-
aster relief that should have otherwise been covered by the NFIP,
Congress rolled out the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of
2012 (BW-12).105 BW-12 was what some now consider an aggressive
departure from the historical practices of the NFIP in an effort to in-
crease the program’s solvency and adequately incentivize preparation
for and insuring against all flood-risk realities.
Under the BW-12, pre-FIRM subsidized premiums would in-
crease at a rate of 25% each year until reaching the full-risk rates for
severe repetitive loss properties—properties with cumulative paid
flood losses exceeding fair market value, non-primary residences, and
businesses/non-residential buildings.106 Policies would also be written
or renewed at full-risk rates for property purchased on or after July 6,
100. FEMA, supra note 39; Community Rating System, FLOODSMART, https://www.flood-
smart.gov/floodsmart/pages/crs/community_rating_system.jsp (last visited Aug. 26, 2015).
101. FEMA, supra note 39.
102. National Flood Insurance Program Community Rating System, FEMA, https://
www.fema.gov/national-flood-insurance-program-community-rating-system (last visited
Aug. 26, 2015).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat.
916-88.
106. FEMA, supra note 39. FEMA defines a severe repetitive loss property as “residen-
tial property that is covered under an NFIP flood insurance policy” and that has at least
four NFIP claim payments with a cumulative amount exceeding $20,000.00; or property “for
which at least two separate claim payments” with a cumulative amount exceeding the mar-
ket value of the building have been made. For both such situations, “at least two of the
referenced claims must have occurred within any ten-year period, and must be greater than
ten days apart.” Severe Repetitive Loss Property Locations in FEMA Regions IV and VI,
\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\10-2\FAM207.txt unknown Seq: 15 22-APR-16 13:24
2015 NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 489
2012; new policies effective on or after July 6, 2012; and lapsed policies
reinstated on or after October 4, 2012.107 With mounting pressure on
multiple fronts, Congress decided to save face rather than protect its
constituency.108 Thus, the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability
Act of 2014 (HFIAA-14) was proposed by Congressmen Menendez and
Grimm and passed.109
If BW-12 was Congress’s Goliath attempt to make the NFIP
functional, the HFIAA-14 was its David-esque response that effectively
dismantled most of BW-12’s best and most aggressive tactics.110 A few
of the most significant provisions of the HFIAA-14 are the repeal of
certain rate increases,111 restoration of grandfathered rates,112 intro-
duction of surcharges for all policies,113 and the gradual integrated
rate increases for newly mapped areas with special flood hazards.114
In its “Repeal of Certain Rate Increases,” the HFIAA-14 re-
pealed any immediate rate increases to actuarial rates and supplanted
the BW-12 provision by requiring gradual rate increases by no less
than five percent annually until the premium reaches its full-risk
rate.115 With regard to premium increases, “the chargeable risk pre-
mium rate for flood insurance under [HFIAA-14] for any property may
not be increased by more than eighteen percent each year.”116 There
are a few exceptions that will retain the BW-12 rate increases: older
business properties insured with subsidized rates, older non-primary
residences insured with subsidized rates, severe repetitive loss proper-
ties insured with subsidized rates, and buildings that have been
FEMA (Feb. 28, 2009), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1709-25045-
4851/2_severerepetetiveloss.pdf.
107. Id.
108. Letter from Gary Thomas, 2013 President, National Association of Realtors, to W.
Craig Fugate, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency (Oct. 10, 2013),
available at http://www.ksefocus.com/billdatabase/clientfiles/172/3/1889.pdf.
109. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, 128
Stat. 1020.
110. Abbott, supra note 72, at 51. HFIAA is one third the length of BW-12.
111. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89,
§ 3(a)(1)(A), 128 Stat. 1021.
112. Id.
113. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, § 8, 128
Stat. 1023-24.
114. § 6, 128 Stat. 1023.
115. FEMA, HOMEOWNER FLOOD INSURANCE AFFORDABILITY ACT OVERVIEW 2 (2014),
available at http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1396551935597-4048b68f6d695a6eb6
e6e7118d3ce464/HFIAA_Overview_FINAL_03282014.pdf.
116. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, § 5(5),
128 Stat. 1022.
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substantially damaged or improvements built before the local adoption
of a FIRM.117
Where the BW-12 included catastrophic loss years in calculat-
ing the “average historical loss year,” the HFIAA-14 no longer requires
the inclusion of catastrophic loss years when determining risk levels—
in effect restoring grandfathered rates.118 In an effort to counteract the
loss of potential revenue generated by the BW-12 immediate premium
increases, the HFIAA-14 implemented a surcharge on all flood insur-
ance policies of $250.00 for non-residential properties and residential
properties that are not the primary residence of an individual, and a
$25.00 surcharge for all other policies.119
HFIAA clarifies the rate at which newly mapped special flood
hazard areas will be assessed and the timeline during which the rate
should reach its actuarial risk level.120 An owner who purchased his or
her property after the enactment of HFIAA and whose property was
recently designated a special flood hazard area would pay the pre-
ferred risk policy premium121 for the first policy year.122 Upon renewal
of such a policy, the premium would be calculated in accordance with
actuarial rates and any flood mitigation activities the owner has
undertaken.123
B. State and Local Initiatives
1. Florida Coastal Management Statutes
Florida has set forth by statute its own efforts to encourage vul-
nerable jurisdictions to develop comprehensive strategies to mitigate
the risks associated with natural disasters and the extensive flood
damage that may result.124 The Florida coastal management legisla-
117. FEMA, supra note 39.
118. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, § 4, 128
Stat. 1022.
119. § 8, 128 Stat. 1023-24.
120. § 6, 128 Stat. 1023.
121. A preferred risk policy offers “multiple coverage combinations for both buildings
and contents [ ] that are located in moderate-to-low risk areas . . . . [These policies] are
available for residential or non-residential buildings also located in these zones, and that
meet eligibility requirements based on the building’s entire flood loss history.” Frequently
Asked Questions, FLOODSMART.GOV, https://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/faqs/
what-is-the-preferred-risk-policy.jsp (last visited Aug. 26, 2015).
122. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, § 6, 128
Stat. 1023.
123. 42 U.S.C. § 4014(a)(1) (2014).
124. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3178 (2015).
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tion mirrors the federal Coastal Zone Management Act.125 In large
part, development and implementation of coastal management is left
to each municipality.126 In one of its first sections, the state statute
lays out the required aspects of these comprehensive plans, and it also
provides recommendations for optional additions to the plans.127 What
is slightly more disturbing is that, by and large, the prudent measures
to protect the coasts and its population from flooding appear to be
optional:
At the option of the local government, develop an adaptation action
area designation for those low-lying coastal zones that are exper-
iencing coastal flooding due to extreme high tides and storm surge
and are vulnerable to the impacts of rising sea level. Local govern-
ments that adopt an adaptation action area may consider policies
within the coastal management element to improve resilience to
coastal flooding resulting from high-tide events, storm surge, flash
floods, stormwater runoff, and related impacts of sea-level rise. Cri-
teria for the adaptation action area may include, but need not be
limited to, areas for which the land elevations are below, at, or near
mean high water, which have a hydrologic connection to coastal wa-
ters, or which are designated as evacuation zones for storm
surge.128
Florida’s coastal management statute covers the basics and allows
each municipality to adopt local ordinances and codes that suit each
municipality’s unique topography, economy, and population.
2. Local Responses and Initiatives
Most coastal counties in Florida have adopted coastal floodplain
management ordinances.129 Generally, each community will develop a
comprehensive code but may focus more on hazards frequently exper-
ienced in their location.130
125. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-65 (2014). Although federal coastal management is relevant, it is
beyond the scope of this paper. For a more in-depth review of federal coastal management
and how it relates to and sometimes diverges from state and local coastal management, see
Chad J. McGuire, Climate Change and the Coastal Zone Management Act:  The Role of Fed-
eralism in Adaptation Strategies, in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW:
U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 419-37 (Randall S. Abate ed., 2015).
126. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3178 (2015).
127. § 163.3177.
128. § 163.3177(6)(g)(10) (emphasis added).
129. See generally MUNICODE, https://www.municode.com/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2015).
130. The purpose of this section is to outline, by way of a three county example, the
general structure and objectives of most municipal flood ordinances in Florida. Specific de-
tail and nuanced differences between and among the counties is beyond the scope of this
paper.
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i. Miami-Dade County and City of Miami Beach
Greater Miami and the Beaches received 14.2 million visitors in
2013, making it one of the most popular destinations in the world.131
While visiting Miami, 43.6% of visitors who used lodging stayed in
Miami Beach.132 Another staggering, although not entirely unex-
pected, statistic is that 68.2% of overnight visitors to Miami visited the
Beaches.133 The total population of Miami-Dade County was estimated
at a little over 2.6 million in 2013.134 Of this total for the county, the
estimated 2013 population for Miami Beach was only 91,026.135 This
section includes both the City of Miami Beach and Miami-Dade
County, because Miami Beach is at increased risk of flooding, and
Miami-Dade is heavily reliant on Miami Beach.
Chapter 54 of the City of Miami Beach’s municipal code is dedi-
cated to floodplain management.136 The code sets out in its statement
of purpose its intention to promote public safety, health, and general
welfare, and to minimize public and private losses from flood condi-
tions by provisions designed to restrict or prohibit uses that are
dangerous because of water or erosion hazards; require uses vulnera-
ble to floods be protected against flood damage throughout their
intended lifespan; control alteration of natural floodplains and natural
protective barriers involved in accommodating floodwaters; control de-
velopment that may increase erosion or flood damage; and prevent or
regulate construction of flood barriers that unnaturally divert floodwa-
ters or increase flood hazards to other lands.137
Miami-Dade County institutes similar objectives with regard to
floodplain management and building codes in coastal flood hazard ar-
eas.138 Among the provisions of this chapter is a requirement that new
construction or substantial improvement construction in coastal flood
hazard areas use construction materials and utility equipment that are
resistant to flood damage and construction practices that minimize
131. Research and Statistics, GREATER MIAMI CONVENTION & VISITORS BUREAU, http://
www.miamiandbeaches.com/sitecore/content/partners/tools-and-resources/research-and-
statistics (last visited Aug. 26, 2015).
132. GREATER MIAMI CONVENTION & VISITORS BUREAU, 2013 VISITOR INDUSTRY OVER-
VIEW 4, available at http://www.miamiandbeaches.com/~/media/files/gmcvb/partners/visitor-
industry-overview-2013.
133. Research and Statistics, supra note 131.
134. State and County Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/
qfd/states/12000.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2015).
135. Id.
136. MIAMI BEACH, FLA., ORDINANCES ch. 54, art. II, § 54 (2009).
137. Id. at § 54.33.
138. MIAMI-DADE, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES, Part III, ch. 11C, § 11C (1974).
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flood damage.139 The County Manager or his designee administers and
enforces the provisions of the floodplain management and building
codes.140
ii. Brevard County
Brevard County sits along Florida’s Atlantic coast and is home
to popular tourist destinations, the Space Coast, and residential ar-
eas.141 Some of the better-known cities in Brevard County include
Cape Canaveral, Cocoa and Cocoa Beach, Indian Harbour Beach, Mel-
bourne, Palm Bay, Rockledge, Satellite Beach, Titusville, and West
Melbourne.142 The U.S. Census Bureau puts the county’s population
around 550,823, as of the 2013 estimate.143 The homeownership rate
from 2009 to 2013 was approximately 73.5%, making residential prop-
erty owners a significant contributor to the population base.144
Brevard puts forth its flood regulations in its Flood Damage
Protection ordinances.145 Similar to Miami Beach and Miami-Dade
County, the purpose of the Brevard ordinances is to promote health,
safety, and general welfare and to “minimize public and private losses
due to flood conditions.”146 The provisions are designed to prevent oc-
currences such as water erosion, flood damage, and acts such as
dredging, which may increase erosion or flood damage.”147
iii. Pinellas County
Although few people may know the county by name, they are
probably familiar with the cities in Pinellas County, including Clear-
water Beach, St. Petersburg Beach, Treasure Island, and countless
more beaches and beach communities throughout.148 An overhead view
of this area shows that it is a peninsula, just like Florida, making it a
peninsula within a peninsula.149 The 2013 population estimate for Pi-
139. Id. at § 11C-3(b).
140. Id. at § 11C-8.
141. BREVARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, http://www.brevardcounty.us/Home (last visited Aug.
26, 2015).
142. Id.
143. State and County Quick Facts, supra note 134.
144. Id.
145. BREVARD, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES, Vol. II, ch. 62, art. XI, § 62.4001 (2014).
146. Id. at § 62-4003.
147. Id. at § 62-4003(1)-(3).
148. PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA, http://www.pinellascounty.org/ (last visited Aug. 26,
2015).
149. VISIT FLORIDA, http://www.visitflorida.com/en-us.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2015).
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nellas was around 929,048.150 Of this total, the homeownership rate
from 2009 through 2013 was sixty-seven percent, making it more resi-
dential than commercial.151 As of the 2010 census, Pinellas’s
population density was 3,300 people per square mile, making it the
most densely populated county in Florida.152
As with most Florida coastal counties, the purpose and objec-
tives with regard to community management of floodplains and flood
areas are generally homogenous.153 Pinellas varies in no significant
way from the purposes set forth by Miami-Dade County, the city of
Miami Beach, or Brevard County.154
Because a national program can do little to address location-
specific issues (population density, residential versus commercial,
wealthy versus impoverished, vulnerability to storm surge versus
downpour flooding, etc.), it only makes sense that the NFIP has fallen
woefully short in providing cogent, long-term adaptation strategies
that best fit each unique coastal community.
III. LOCATION-SENSITIVE PROVISIONS FOR NFIP ADAPTATION
TO CLIMATE CHANGE
Keeping in mind that the NFIP has a community rating system
that allows for greater discounts for flood preparedness and mitigation,
it would stand to reason that communities in a state like Florida with
coasts on three sides would be ranked high on the list to secure the best
discount for its residents.155 Sadly, that is not the case. Not one com-
munity in Florida that is eligible to participate in the CRS is rated
better than a five.156 While each of the three counties and one city dis-
cussed have implemented floodplain management ordinances in
compliance with the NFIP, they are still not doing enough to enforce
the rules already on the books and motivate their residents to take
more rigorous proactive measures. Allowing subsidies and
grandfathered rates is not the same as providing a discount for imple-
150. State and County Quick Facts, supra note 134.
151. Id.
152. Guide to 2010 Census State and Local Geography - Florida, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/geo/reference/guidestloc/st12_fl.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2015).
153. See generally MUNICODE, supra note 129.
154. PINELLAS, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES, Part III, ch. 158, § 158 (1995).
155. FEMA, supra note 39; National Flood Insurance Program Community Rating Sys-
tem, supra note 102.
156. National Flood Insurance Program Community Rating System, supra note 102.
One is the best rating, ten means the locale does not participate, and nine is the worst
rating. Id.
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menting proper mitigation techniques. With subsidies and
grandfathered rates, the NFIP is basically rewarding the most at-risk
properties, which is entirely counterintuitive to its purpose. The NFIP
rate estimate policies, as reformed by the HFIAA, have become less
financially burdensome than the provisions of the BW-12 by allowing
the end goals of the BW-12 to be implemented more slowly over time,
rather than immediate increases after a triggering event.157
It has become apparent that allowing more policyholders to pay
less is not helping the NFIP repay its debt to the treasury.158 Intui-
tively, policyholders would be unlikely to voluntarily participate if they
would end up paying more in premiums for the same policies. It could
be argued that, at least in part, the financial solvency of the NFIP was
predicated on the notion that the program could make up in volume
what it lacked in actuarially sound policies. Without requiring commu-
nities to participate, it is difficult to see how this particular end was
justified by its means.
A. General Provisions
Consistent with the HFIAA-14, the eventual elimination of sub-
sidies and grandfathered rates is essential to extending the life of the
NFIP. The policy surcharges imposed also promote that objective. Con-
sistently calculating in catastrophic loss years in estimating the FIRM
risks will help bring the policy rates steadily back to actuarial sound-
ness. These policy changes and premium adjustments happen across
the board but still do not provide struggling property owners with
enough relief when it comes to insuring or reinsuring property in flood
prone areas.
B. Every City is Not the Same: Location-Sensitive Provisions
Just like car insurance providers take into account multiple fac-
tors when determining the rates they provide to individual drivers, so
should flood insurance providers—and not just the FIRM information
provided by FEMA. It is equally as important to take into account the
local population base and economies of each city and county participat-
ing in the NFIP.
157. See Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126
Stat. 916-88.
158. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15.
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1. Miami-Dade County and City of Miami Beach:
Taxes and Tourists
Thankfully, Miami-Dade County and the city of Miami Beach
do participate in the CRS, but as of October 2014, Miami-Dade County
held a rating of five and the City of Miami Beach held a rating of six.159
With a rating of five, Miami-Dade County is able to offer a 25% dis-
count on policies in special flood hazard areas and a 10% discount for
non-special flood hazard areas. Miami Beach, at a six, can offer a 20%
discount on special flood hazard policies and the same 10% on non-
special flood hazard policies.160
Arguably, the most immediate and irreversible threats to this
region of Florida are sea-level rise, higher levels of tidal flooding, and
storm surge reaching farther inland from more intense storm activity
and hurricanes. Most of the Miami Beach area is developed, with con-
dominium high rises, resorts, and tourist destinations, as tourism is its
number one industry.161 Most of Miami Beach’s economy is tied to the
high rates of tourism, but at the projected rates of sea-level rise, it is
estimated that by 2030, the frequency of tidal flooding will increase
from six to forty-five events per year.162
Miami Beach and Miami-Dade County need to tighten their
proverbial ships to allow the residents in each location to qualify for
the most generous discounts available by the NFIP through the CRS.
Considering that these regions are most at risk for extreme flooding, it
is baffling that the two locations have not done everything in their
power to mandate and enforce coastal floodplain management provi-
sions to achieve the highest rating the NFIP CRS has to offer, thereby
adding to the protection of each to the highest extent possible and mak-
ing insurance more affordable to the residents. The NFIP can help this
particular region by focusing on policy adjustments that address the
manner in which FEMA incorporates sea level rise and tidal flooding
into its risk mapping and aggressive marketing to inform the commu-
nity of the financial realities of their investments.
Since a majority of Miami Beach is commercial property, busi-
nesses are likely to be more resilient than residential property owners
to flood insurance rate increases. Also, due to Miami’s widespread reli-
ance on tourism, business owners are eager to keep new and returning
visitors coming to its beaches. Implementing a tax credit scheme, re-
159. National Flood Inurance Program Community Rating System, supra note 102.
160. Id.
161. SPANGER-SIEGFRIED ET AL., supra note 31.
162. Id.
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warding mitigation efforts, and penalizing lapses in coverage or below
risk policy premiums should motivate business owners to protect their
investments and keep tourists (rather than the ocean) flooding through
their doors. With regard to residential property owners, multi-million
dollar homes predominate some of the most at-risk residential neigh-
borhoods in Miami Beach. These owners have likely already taken
property mitigation precautions or are financially stable enough to sur-
vive a complete loss. By implementing a tax credit system in a county
and city dominated by tourist-industry businesses, commercial proper-
ties, and wealthy residential property owners, the NFIP could shift the
financial burden to the tourists and more palpably encourage mitiga-
tion and adaptation strategies.
2. Brevard County: Bring Back Private Insurers
Brevard County boasts on its website that it participates in the
NFIP’s CRS163 but, like Miami-Dade County, its rating is lower than it
should be.164 At a rating of seven, Brevard secures a discount of 15%
for policies taken out in special flood hazard areas and a 5% discount
for non-special flood hazard areas.165 While some discount is better
than none, these reductions are effectively removed when you take into
account the gradual increases mandated by the HFIAA-14.166
Although Brevard has taken proactive measures in updating its
FIRMs and reassessing insurance requirements and premiums, the
backlash was almost immediate. A resident of Rockledge, in Brevard,
was shocked to find that, in 2014, her home was remapped into a flood
zone.167 FEMA responded by providing the resident with two options:
pay a minimum of $1,000 to get her own survey and resubmit the data
to FEMA, or continue spending hundreds of dollars a month on flood
insurance.168 Having lived in her neighborhood for over ten years and
never having experienced a flood or even pooling water following
strong storms, she is concerned that the extra expense will force her
out of her home.169
Perhaps the best solution for Rockledge, Brevard County, and
other similarly situated cities and counties in combating the rising cost
163. National Flood Insurance Program Community Rating System, supra note 102.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, § 6, 128
Stat. 1023.
167. Heath, supra note 4.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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of flood insurance in an age of unprecedented rising seas may be at
least a partial shift back to private flood insurance. In a market-based
economy, private insurers are compelled to provide actuarially sound
policies at competitive rates if they are to remain solvent. The idea of
reintroducing private flood insurance is already gaining traction in the
Florida State Senate.170 The proposition that private flood insurance
could fix at least some of the NFIP’s problems is not without some crit-
ics.171 However, because a private company will generally dictate the
terms upon which a policy may be issued, these private insurers are in
a much better position than the attenuated reach of the federal govern-
ment to incentivize and monitor mitigation approaches and enforce
penalties for allowing policies to lapse. The consumer base for private
flood insurance could not be more robust than it is now in the era of
failed governmental reforms and societal backlashes.
3. Pinellas County: Buyouts for Those Already in Trouble
Like Brevard, Pinellas County holds a rating of seven in the
NFIP’s CRS and offers the same percentage discounts to its re-
sidents.172 The difference is that Pinellas’s population density dwarfs
that of Brevard, which can be readily inferred just by looking at the
size of each county in comparison.173 With more people tightly packed
into a smaller area, the effects of flooding, hurricanes, and storm surge
are felt by a greater number of people and have more structures upon
which to inflict damage. A lot of Pinellas’s infrastructure was put into
place before the NFIP, and a number of its communities are filled with
homes and buildings constructed before FIRMs became available.174
This leaves the area particularly vulnerable to sea level rise and floods
reaching farther inland, perhaps from both sides, converging in the
middle of the peninsula.
In addition to the HFIAA-14 policy changes, this area would
most likely benefit from a buyout program for distressed owners who
simply cannot afford the real cost of flood insurance or to rebuild their
170. Mary Ellen Klas, State Senate Passes Bill to Give Florida Flood Insurance Option,
MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/state/article1962053
.html; Bradley L. Kading, Commentary: Private Insurance Market is Ready for Flood Op-
tions, PALM BEACH POST (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/opinion/
commentary-private-insurance-market-is-ready-for-f/njzPw/.
171. Ron Hurtibise, Private Flood Insurance Offerings Grow, But Not for Cheap Subsi-
dized Policies, SUN SENTINEL (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/business/fl-
private-flood-insurance-20140927-story.html.
172. National Flood Insurance Program Community Rating System, supra note 102.
173. State and County Quick Facts, supra note 134.
174. PINELLAS COUNTY, supra note 148.
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homes to make them more resistant to flooding. Barrier island towns
and cities, including Indian Rocks Beach, Indian Shores, Redington
Beach, Redington Shores, and Madeira Beach, protect a lot of the main
trunk of Pinellas. As the names suggest, most of these towns and cities,
and by extension their economies, are based on or around beaches and
beach activities. Retreat from these areas can only flee so far away
from the Gulf before residents meet the intra-coastal on the other side.
A member of the Indian Shores Town Council put it best when, in re-
sponse to NFIP rate hikes, he said: “I built this according to code and
I’m on the intra[-]coastal side, not the Gulf; but in the real world, if we
have a direct hit, we’re going to be a speed bump for the mainland.”175
In the same article, the council member indicated that under FEMA’s
new maps of his city, insurance rates for his residents doubled or trip-
led, noting that lifting a fifty-year-old beach cottage is likely too
expensive for many, leaving the residents no other choice but to leave
or hope for the best. This is where the buyout program, similar to the
one established in New Jersey after Superstorm Sandy, would provide
a third option.
Using the Superstorm Sandy Blue Acres Buyout (Blue Acres)
program in New Jersey as a guide, Florida could implement a similar
program to give distressed owners a way to leave their homes with
something, rather than remaining in a home that will likely be under-
water, both literally and figuratively. In New Jersey’s Blue Acres
program, the state uses federal disaster funds to give owners the op-
tion to sell Sandy-damaged homes in flood-prone areas at pre-storm
value.176 The program uses some of the following criteria to evaluate
each neighborhood within which it decides to offer buyouts: flood dam-
age from Superstorm Sandy, or repeated flood damage from previous
storms; willing sellers (as the program is strictly voluntary); clusters of
flood-prone homes, or whole neighborhoods; and other criteria.177
Pinellas could benefit from utilizing the same criteria, but with
some adjustments. Although highly vulnerable to flooding and hurri-
canes, Pinellas remains largely unscathed in comparison to Louisiana,
New Jersey, and other parts of Florida. The proposed program for Pi-
nellas, or Florida generally, could be adjusted to include the following
provisions: repeated flood damage from previous storms or storm
175. Boatwright, supra note 3.
176. Blue Acres Floodplain Acquisition, NEW JERSEY DEP’T ENVTL PROT., http://www
.state.nj.us/dep/greenacres/blue_flood_ac.html#overview (last updated May 20, 2015).
177. Other criteria include: support from the local government; cost-effectiveness of the
buyout according to FEMA guidelines under federal law; and opportunity for significant
environmental impact and/or improvement to public health, safety, and welfare. Id.
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surges; willing sellers (as the program is strictly voluntary); support
from the local government; clusters of flood-prone homes, or whole
neighborhoods; cost-effectiveness of the buyout according to FEMA
guidelines under federal law; opportunity for significant environmen-
tal impact and/or improvement to public health, safety, and welfare;
predicted sea level rise and tidal flooding models; and allowing for com-
mercial properties to be considered, but contemplating the potential
local economic impact of buyout for these properties.
While the buyout program would not be a panacea for all the
issues facing the residents of Pinellas in securing affordable flood in-
surance, it at least allows for another alternative to spending money
the residents likely do not have.
CONCLUSION
The federal government’s attempt at flood insurance through
the NFIP has continued to limp on in the wake of reform after reform
and superstorms, alike. The problem is that exponentially intensifying
effects of climate change have become the deathblows to an already
mortally wounded program, much to the chagrin of those denying that
climate change is a reality for this generation. The climate change ad-
aptation sensitive options that should and need to be instituted within
the NFIP, particularly to protect Florida, are not intended to be a cure,
but rather a procedure by which the NFIP’s life is extended. It is inevi-
table that the NFIP’s ship should sink if it remains on its current
course, but that does not mean Florida’s residents have to go down
with it.
